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In much of Asia and Africa, it is only modest hyperbole to assert that the Marxian prophecy 
has had an ethnic fulfillment.
Donald L. Horowitz (1985) —
A classical literature views economic class divisions as the main cause of social conflict.1 Yet 
many, if not most, of the conflicts we observe today are ethnic in nature. As Rogers Brubaker 
and David D. Laitin (1998) observe, “[An] aspect of the post–Cold War world to highlight is 
the eclipse of the left-right ideological axis that has defined the grand lines of much political 
conflict—and many civil wars—since the French Revolution. … Today, these incentives to frame 
conflicts in grand ideological terms have disappeared. … [T]his has led to a marked ethnicization 
of violent challenger-incumbent contests.” Similarly, an important theme in Horowitz’s monu-
mental book (1985) is that warring groups are—more often than not—“horizontally” differenti-
ated by ethnic or religious markers, unlike the “vertical” wealth or income markers inherent in 
class antagonisms.
The salience of ethnic conflict, especially in societies with marked economic inequalities, 
poses a serious puzzle for social scientists. Certainly, rich historical studies are widely available,2 
but a rigorous analytical framework is missing. Brubaker and Laitin (1998) and James D. Fearon 
and Laitin (2000) describe different approaches to the question of salience, and we refer the 
reader to these two papers for a useful perspective.
In particular, the existing literature is replete with case studies that show how the elites might 
manipulate ethnic markers for their own survival or gain—Fearon and Laitin (2000) refer to this 
theme as the “dominant or most common narrative.”3 Yet there is a gap: “A major puzzle in this 
story is why ethnic publics follow leaders down paths that seem to serve elite power interests 
most of all.”
Why do the masses follow? The literature at this point becomes far more speculative. There is 
the role played by inflammatory discourse, including the use of history or myth (see, e.g., Bruce 
Kapferer 1998). Or elites might affect mass beliefs in a coordination game, precipitating the bad 
(conflictual) equilibrium and eliminating others involving peaceful coexistence.4 After all, even 
1 With Karl Marx as the forerunner, Lewis A. Coser (1956), Ralf G. Dahrendorf (1959), Morton Deutsch (1971), Ted 
R. Gurr (1970, 1980), Georg Simmel (1955), and Charles Tilly (1978) are representatives of this literature.
2 See, e.g., Francis Deng (1995), Chip Gagnon (1994-5), Gérard Prunier (1995), Stanley J. Tambiah (1986, 1996) and 
especially Horowitz (1985).
3 Elites might achieve this by the use of history, legend, or myth, or by the creation or framing of incidents (such as 
murder, rape, or looting) in explicitly ethnic terms.
4 For a recent application of the “belief-contagion” approach pioneered by Hans Carlsson and Eric van Damme 
(1993) to questions of intergroup cooperation, see Kaushik Basu (2005).
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rational players with dispersed priors will suitably update their beliefs following an incident that 
might be racial or ethnic in nature (Rui de Figueiredo and Barry R. Weingast 1999).
We take the position that “prize-grabbing” on a large scale—often economic but possibly 
political, cultural, or religious in nature—is frequently at the heart of ethnic conflict, both for the 
elites as well as for the masses.5 In particular, we view social conflict as the attempted takeover 
of “budgets” or “policies” that produce various public goods. Such budgets or policies may be 
used to benefit one class over another, e.g., health (public versus private), education (primary 
versus higher), infrastructure, or attitudes toward foreign investment or globalization. They may 
also have distinct ethnic implications, e.g., the funding and support for religious festivals and 
processions, the proclamation of “secular” or “majoritarian” identities, the design of educational 
curricula, or job reservations. To seize these budgets, we suppose that groups must form either 
class-based or ethnic alliances (but not both). We presume that the outcome of an ethnic conflict 
does not affect the class composition of the budget, and that the outcome of a class conflict does 
not affect the ethnic composition of the budget. Or there may be no conflict, in which case both 
compositions remain unaffected.
We show that in a “symmetric” world in which the two aspects of public budgets have similar 
importance, there is a definite bias in favor of ethnic conflict, and we uncover a fundamental 
source of this bias. Moreover, we show that the bias persists to a significant degree when the 
symmetry is removed, e.g., even when the relative importance of the ethnic budget is “small.” 
Therefore, while not asserting that conflict per se must be an equilibrium outcome, we argue that 
conflict, if it breaks out, is likely to be ethnic in nature.
A series of propositions in the paper develop this idea, but it is worth highlighting the main 
source of the bias right away. A class division creates groups that display strong within-group 
economic homogeneity. While this makes the resulting class conflict clear and well defined, it 
also makes it extremely difficult to conduct for the poor, because the opportunity cost of resources 
is so very high. The rich, on the other hand, do have a low opportunity cost of resources. But even 
if they could marshall a mercenary army of the poor to pursue their ends, they lack the incentive 
to initiate an overt redistributive conflict.6
In contrast, ethnic alliances display high within-group economic inequality. Such inequalities 
possess their own perverse synergy. Specifically, the rich within a group can supply the resources 
for conflict, while the poor supply conflict labor. It is a synergy that can be put to powerful use, 
and one that is missing within an alliance based on class alone.7
The fact that the rich have the money and the poor their labor also permits us to illustrate a 
particular pathway precipitating ethnic conflict. In some cases, the rich may prefer peace over-
all, yet “propose” an ethnic alliance in order to prevent a class conflict initiated by the poor (see 
Proposition 3 and the last part of Proposition 6). Moreover, we show that this is an alternative 
that the poor rationally accept.
Section I sets up the framework. Proposition 1 in Section II describes conditions for the emer-
gence of peace or different types of conflict. Section III builds on this result and contains the 
5 See, e.g., Scott Straus (2005), Catherine André and Jean-Philippe Platteau (1998), Asghar Ali Engineer (2002), 
and Fearon and Laitin (2000). James A. Robinson (2001), Esteban and Ray (2005), and Francesco Caselli and W. John 
Coleman II (2006) all discuss models of ethnic conflict in which economic resources may be at stake. Perhaps closest to 
the spirit of the questions asked here is Robinson (2001), in which a model of conflict is formulated that can take place 
either along class lines or along ethnic lines. He shows that the latter will in general be more severe than the former, 
though to be sure, this does not address the issue of which division is likely to be the more salient.
6 An overt conflict is to be distinguished, of course, from lower-key, everyday methods that the rich might employ 
to keep the income distribution unequal.
7 Actually, in our model we allow for the possibility that the rich may be able to buy conflict labor at the same com-
pensation rate as the poor, even in the case of class conflict. But this alone—as we show—is not generally enough for 
the rich to want to initiate class conflict.
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main analysis, summarized in Propositions 2–5 and the accompanying discussions. Section IV 
briefly discusses extensions, including one to conflict over private goods. Section V concludes.
I. A Model of Salience
A. Classes and Ethnicities
Suppose that a society could be divided into economic or ethnic groups, each a two-way 
split. Call the two economic groups (or classes) rich (r ) and poor ( p). Let nr and np stand for the 
population proportions of the rich and poor, respectively, and denote by yr and yp the per capita 
incomes of these two groups.
The other way to divide society is into two ethnic groups, which we index by h and m. Denote 
by nh and nm the population proportions of these two groups. We take it that nh . nm: group h 
is the ethnic majority. The poor of this ethnicity will be referred to as the poor ethnic majority; 
parallel terminology applies to the other three intersections.
It is certainly possible that per capita incomes are systematically correlated with ethnic iden-
tity. But we shall concern ourselves in what follows with the limiting case of unranked ethnic 
groups, in which the mix of rich and poor in each group is identical, so that groups h and m have 
the same per capita incomes.
B. Class and Ethnic Public Goods
The status quo situation is one in which no group is engaged in conflict. In this starting situ-
ation we suppose that the state produces—or supports the production of—a variety of public 
goods. Such goods may represent physical commodities, such as hospitals or roads, but they can 
also stand for the strength of different attitudes or ideologies, such as socialism or Hindutva. 
Broadly speaking, the public goods under consideration are assumed to display one of two fun-
damental characteristics: a class characteristic or an ethnic characteristic.
Examples of the former include health (public versus private), education (primary versus 
higher), infrastructure (transportation, electricity, communications), public education, public 
transportation, or attitudes to foreign investment or globalization. We shall suppose that we can 
place a monetary value on all this. Denote by C the total class budget available to “fund” such 
goods in the status quo situation.
Examples of ethnic-based public goods include the funding and support of religious festivals 
and processions, temples, and madrasas, as well as the proclaiming of “secular” or “majoritarian” 
identities. They also include employment in or access to certain economic sectors dominated by 
one ethnic group or the other. They can include access to natural resources if these fund ethnic 
causes, and they include possible job reservations in bureaucratic or political positions. Denote 
by E the total ethnic budget available to “fund” such goods in the status quo situation.
We suppose that such goods are pure public goods, so that the population sizes of different 
groups do not determine the set of feasible per capita allocations. In Section IVD we argue that 
the assumption of pure public goods is unimportant for the main results.
C. Alliances and Conflict
Groups can remain at peace or enter into “conflict.” We suppose that no conflict is possible 
without the forming of an explicit alliance. There are only two possible types of alliances in this 
model. A class alliance is a merging of interests over ethnic groups, but maintaining distinc-
tion between p and r. The conflict, if any, is then over the capture of the class budget. An ethnic 
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 alliance is a merging of interests over classes, but maintaining the distinction between ethnicities 
h and m. The conflict, if any, is then over the capture of the ethnic budget.
In what follows, the subscript i will always index a class alliance or an economic subgroup (of 
an ethnic alliance). The subscript j will always index an ethnic alliance or an ethnic subgroup 
(of a class alliance).
D. Elements of a strategic Approach
The following multistage model captures the essential features of alliance formation, hostility, 
and peace:
Stage 1. salience.—Alliances form (or not), along either class or ethnic lines. If a coalition is 
formed, move to Stage 2. Otherwise, each group receives peace payoffs, to be described below.
Stage 2. Hostility.—Each side adopts “hostile” or “peaceful” stances. If either side is hostile, 
move to Stage 3. Otherwise, receive “peace payoffs.”
Stage 3. Conflict.—Each alliance contributes militants or activists. They enter into conflict, 
and each side receives “conflict payoffs,” to be described below.
E. Peace Payoffs
In the absence of any conflict, all parties get peace payoffs. We presume that in peacetime, 
class i obtains a given share si of the class budget C, and ethnicity j gets a share sj of the ethnic 
budget E. So an individual in group ij, with i a class index and j an ethnic index, obtains a peace-
time payoff of
 u 1 yi 2 1 siC 1 sj E.
F. Conflict Payoffs
We assume that all conflict is carried out by “militants” or “activists.” First consider a class 
alliance, where individuals of similar incomes band together irrespective of ethnicity. Let Ai 
represent the number of activists contributed by each side i 5 p, r. Then we suppose that class i 
obtains a share
 Ai          
 Ap 1 Ar
of the class budget,8 while the shares of the ethnic budget are unaffected by class conflict.
Similarly, conflict among ethnic alliances generates a share of the ethnic budget that is pro-
portional to the activists Aj contributed by each side j 5 h, m, while the shares of the class budget 
are assumed to remain unaffected.
8 This share could equivalently stand for the probability that alliance i seizes the entire class budget.
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To specify net payoffs, we subtract the cost of supplying activists. We follow Esteban and Ray 
(2005) in supposing that activists must be compensated for their pains. Denote by wk the compen-
sation rate payable in a generic alliance k. Then the total expenditure for alliance k is wk Ak.
To summarize, a person of ethnicity j who contributes finances Aji to a class alliance i will 
get
 Ai u 1 yi 2 Aji 2 1          C 1 sj E, Ap 1 Ar
where Ai (times wi ) is the aggregate over all individual finances. Similarly, a person of class i 
who contributes finances Aij to an ethnic alliance j will get
 Aj u 1 yi 2 Aij 2 1         E 1 si C, Ah 1 Am
where Aj 1 times wj 2 is the aggregate over all individual finances.
In keeping with our focus on economic similarity across ethnic groups, we suppose that 
wh 5 wm. Unranked ethnicity therefore refers to both the equality of shares of rich and poor in 
each ethnic group and equality in compensation costs for activists.
Our specification of conflict is extremely minimal. In particular, we assume that the only costs 
of conflict lie in the recruitment and maintenance of militants. To be sure, there may be other 
costs, such as the destruction of output. Building these in will (obviously) generate a greater ten-
dency toward peace, but will not change the ethnic bias that we uncover (see Section B).
G. A symmetric Benchmark
A particularly stark, neutral benchmark is obtained by assuming symmetry. This is described 
by the following characteristics:
 (i) The class and ethnic budgets are the same: C . E.
 (ii) All peace shares are the same: sh 5 sm 5 sr 5 sp 5 1/2.
 (iii) In class or ethnic conflict, the compensation rates across alliances are the same: wp 5 wr and 
wh 5 wm.
 (iv) The two dominant majority groups are of similar size: nh 5 np.
Condition (i) asserts that ethnic and class considerations are equally important in the aggre-
gate for society. Condition (ii) asserts that there is no “allocative bias” in either of these two 
“budgets.” Condition (iii) is already implicit in unranked ethnic alliances, while applied to class 
alliances it implies that the rich can raise a mercenary army in a class conflict. Condition (iv) is 
stated in overly strong form, but we retain it to round off a full description of symmetry 1what we 
do use is the supposition that nh $ np 2 .
Obviously, it is an exaggeration to assert that symmetry is a precise description of reality. 
Yet it would be equally absurd to offer some initial insights into the salience question without 
some benchmarking of the relative importance of class versus ethnicity. We therefore employ 
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 symmetry as a point of departure for the discussion, as a means of examining whether the model 
generates any systematic bias toward one form of conflict. However, we do not confine ourselves 
to symmetry. It is more a methodological starting point than anything else.
II. Some Preliminary Observations
A. Overview
Our approach is standard: we solve for the equilibrium of the conflict game, and then work 
backward.
Begin, then, with stage 3, in which activists are contributed contingent on the declara-
tion of hostile intentions. There are several ways to model this stage, all presumably quite 
reasonable. We choose one. We suppose that there are leaders for each alliance—so that we 
sidestep the usual free-rider problem—but also assume there is a leader for each distinct 
economic subgroup.
For class alliances there is only one economic group with a single leader. In an ethnic alliance 
there are two economic groupings in each alliance; we assume that each of these looks out for its own 
economic interest despite the formation of the alliance. Otherwise, an ethnic alliance may be seized 
upon to effect huge conflict-free redistributions across classes, a possibility we find unrealistic.
B. Equilibrium in Class Conflict
In a class alliance, there is a single leader who exacts contributions from each member of the 
alliance with a view to maximizing the per capita payoff to the economic grouping as a whole:
 wi  Ai Ai(1)  u ayi 2      b 1           C, ni Ap1 Ar
where we ignore the ethnic share because it is unaffected by class conflict. Say that 1A*p , A*r2 is an 
equilibrium (of class conflict) if for each i, A*i maximizes (1), subject to the constraint that Ak 5 
A*k for k Z i.
C. Equilibrium in Ethnic Conflict
Consider an ethnic alliance j and class subgrouping i within that alliance. Recall that the 
subgroup ij makes its choice of activists to maximize its own interest. Formally, given a supply 
of activists by the opposing alliance, and given the choice of activists A 12i 2 j made by the other 
subgroup in the alliance, group ij chooses Aij to maximize
 wj  Aij Aj(2)  u ayi 2      b 1         E, nij Ah 1 Am
where Aj ; Aij 1 A 12i 2 j . (Now we may ignore the class share.) An equilibrium (of ethnic conflict) 
is a set of four numbers A*ij , where i [ 5p, r6 and j [ 5h, m 6, such that each grouping ij maximizes 
(2) with respect to Aij , given that other numbers in that expression are set equal to their starred 
values.
It is perfectly possible that one or more of these numbers is zero—that some economic group 
consists of financial noncontributors. (However, they may still contribute to the conflict by sup-
plying labor.)
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D. Conflict or Peace?
The proposition in this section serves as a foundation for the remainder of the paper. To state 
it, denote by lik ; Aik /Ak the share of financial contributions made by economic group i within a 
generic alliance k. And let sk ; Ak / 1Ak 1 A/2 denote the share of activists coming from alliance 
k, when alliances k and / are engaged in conflict.
PROPOSITION 1: Assume that “contributions are small relative to income,” i.e., that u9 is 
approximately constant across any person’s income and his income net of contributions.
(i) An economic subgroup i in an alliance k prefers conflict to peace if and only if
(3)  lik sk
2 1 11 2 lik 2sk . sk.
(ii) A group with economic status i and ethnicity j 1i 5 p or r, j 5 h or m 2 obtains higher pay-
offs from ethnic relative to class conflict if and only if
(4)  3 lij nj2 1 11 2 lij 2 nj 2 sj 4 m . si2 2 si ,
where m 5 E/C.
For a proof, see the Appendix.
It is clear from this proposition that, in principle, any of the three outcomes—peace, ethnic 
conflict, or class conflict—is possible. The remainder of the paper argues, however, that these 
conditions are systematically biased against class conflict. Before we begin this argument, how-
ever, we provide a quick interpretation of Proposition 1.
First look at condition (3) on conflict versus peace. Note that if an alliance has only one con-
tributing economic subgroup—for instance, if the alliance is a class alliance—then lik 5 1, and 
(3) reduces to
(5)  sk . Vs k .
That is, for financial contributors to buy into conflict, conflict must improve equilibrium shares 
“sufficiently” relative to peace. This makes perfect sense as resources are being spent during 
conflict. On the other hand, for financial noncontributors we have lik 5 0, so that (3) reduces to 
the more straightforward requirement sk . sk.
Next, focus on equilibrium shares. When conflict occurs across unranked ethnic groups, one 
expects that all differences in equilibrium shares will come from differences in group popu-
lation shares (as indeed established formally in Lemma 1 in the Appendix), so that nj 5 sj. 
Consequently, for economic subgroup i in alliance j, the preference for conflict over peace 
reduces to the condition
(6)  lij n
2
j 1 11 2 lij 2nj . sj.
We may now use (5) and (6) to provide some intuition for the second part of the proposition. 
We’ve already encountered the expressions on each side of (4): their signs (positive or negative) 
determine whether particular forms of conflict are preferred to peace. It so happens that the very 
same expressions, weighted by a term 1m 2 that captures the importance of one sort of public good 
relative to another, allows us to rank the payoffs across the two types of conflict.
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It should be noted that the proposition is unsatisfactory in that it employs endogenous vari-
ables—lij and si—in the condition (4). As we apply the proposition to different cases, we will 
use bounds that remove this endogeneity.
Finally, a word on the small-contributions assumption: it is used to neglect local changes in 
marginal utility (piecewise linearity of the utility function would be sufficient). This restriction 
is essentially for ease of exposition, as it allows us to derive conditions (3) and (4) in particularly 
tight form.
III. The Salience of Ethnicity
In this section, we use Proposition 1 to examine the salience of ethnicity in the formation of 
conflict alliances. Three observations will be central to the argument, and in what follows we 
devote a subsection to each.
A. The Poor Ethnic Majority
We begin with a formal proposition for the case of symmetry and then extend the argument.
PROPOSITION 2: Under symmetry, the poor ethnic majority prefers ethnic conflict to class 
conflict.
PROOF:
Under the symmetric benchmark, m 5 1, sh 5 sp, and np . sp, so that to verify (4) of Proposition 
1 it is sufficient to check the condition
 lph n
2
h 1 11 2 lph 2nh $ n2p .
Obviously, nh $ np is implied by symmetry and suffices for this inequality.
The remainder of this section shows how far we can relax the assumptions of symmetry and 
yet retain the conclusion of Proposition 2.
Population shares.—Note that nh $ np is sufficient for the proposition. In the Indian case, 
which particularly interests us, this condition is likely to hold. With redistributive class conflict, 
mean income is the appropriate dividing line between the “rich” and the “poor.” Roughly 65–70 
percent of the Indian economy may be classified as “poor” according to this definition,9 while nh 
is around 85 percent.
Yet even this inequality relies on the extreme presumption that the poor in an ethnic alliance 
supply all the finance for ethnic conflict! At the other extreme (but a more realistic one), the poor 
contribute none of the finances. Then all that is needed is nh $ n
2
p, which is a far weaker restric-
tion. For instance, if 70 percent are below mean income, then nh $ 1/2 will suffice.
Importance of the Ethnic Public Good.—Retain the symmetry assumptions but drop the 
requirement that m 5 1: allow for the relative importance of the ethnic public good to vary. Then 
np . sp, so that by (4), a sufficient condition for the poor ethnic majority to prefer ethnic over 
class conflict is
9 See World Bank (2003). About two-thirds of Indian incomes lie below Indian per capita income, which was USD 
460 (in 2001 exchange rate dollars). Of course, this cutoff is not to be confused with definitions of absolute poverty, 
which depend on the use of a poverty line and will typically yield much lower numbers.
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 n2p 2 10.52
 m .             .
 11 2 lph 2 nh 1 lphn2h 2 10.52
The extent of this preference becomes clear with some numbers. If we set np 5 nh 5 0.8 and lph 
5 1/2, ethnic conflict is preferred by the poor if the ethnic public good is approximately 65 percent 
as valuable (or more) relative to the class good.
In these numbers the poor are contributing the same financial resources to ethnic conflict as 
the rich are. If the rich contribute all the financial resources, the required threshold for m drops 
to 47 percent.
If np were now to fall, the effect would be heightened further. At np around 70 percent, the 
threshold for m drops to 0: the poor do not gain anything from class conflict at all, but continue 
to gain from ethnic conflict.
Peacetime shares.—Now go back to m 5 1 (so that ethnic and class goods are equally impor-
tant), and examine ethnic bias under different peacetime shares for public goods. A sufficient 
condition for (4) is then
 sp . sh 1 3n2p 2 n2h 4 2 11 2 lph 2 1nh 2 n2h 2 .
If np 5 0.7 and nh 5 0.85 (roughly replicating the Indian figures), while sh 5 1/2, the poor 
would focus on ethnic conflict even if their access to the class public good fell to a number as low 
as 20 percent of the total, and even if they had to put up half the financial resources for ethnic 
conflict.
Finally, if the poor supply only conflict labor 1lph 5 02 , they would hone in on ethnic conflict 
even if their access to the class public good fell to 15 percent of the total!
To summarize: the poor ethnic majority prefer ethnic to class conflict in the case of symmetry 
(Proposition 2). The discussion following that proposition shows that the bias survives even when 
symmetry is dropped to a significant degree.
B. The Rich Ethnic Majority
Now we study the preferences of the rich ethnic majority, starting again with the symmetric 
case:
PROPOSITION 3: Under symmetry, the rich ethnic majority prefers ethnic conflict to class 
conflict whenever the poor ethnic majority prefers class conflict to peace.
PROOF:
Suppose that the poor ethnic majority prefers class conflict to peace. Then sp $ sp, so that sr 
# sr . Consequently, to verify (4), it is sufficient to check that
(7)  1 31 2 lrh 4 nh 1 lrh n2h 2 sh 2 m . s2r 2 sr  .
Under symmetry, this condition is always satisfied.
In what follows, we move away once again from the symmetric case.
Large Ethnic Majority.—The right-hand side of (7) is negative. Therefore, Proposition 3 holds 
automatically (with no symmetry restrictions) if the left-hand side of (7) is nonnegative.
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This is entirely possible: in the Indian case, nh is around 85 percent, so that (7) is satisfied as 
long as sh is no greater than 70 percent, i.e., as long as the majoritarian ethnic group receives 
less than twice the per capita ethnic benefits. This upper bound is higher if the poor contribute 
financially to the ethnic conflict: for instance, it rises to over 80 percent if the poor collectively 
contribute a fifth of the financial resources.
Thus, if the ethnic majority is large enough, Proposition 3 extends costlessly.
small Ethnic Majority.—Now suppose that the left-hand side of (7) is negative (the ethnic 
majority is “not very large”). Then that inequality reduces to
 sr 11 2 sr2(8)  m ,             .
 sh 2 31 2 lrh 4 nh 2 lrh n2h
If nh is at least as large as the two peace shares sh and sr  , and E # C, then (8) is satisfied. Indeed, 
it is satisfied quite comfortably. Try, for instance, equal peacetime shares and nh equal to 0.8; 
then m # 3 is enough.
One aspect of this last discussion seems strange: a lower value of m actually makes it more 
likely that (8) will hold. The reason is simple: when the left-hand side of (8) is negative, we are in 
a world in which the rich want neither ethnic conflict nor class conflict. Both create losses. But 
ethnic conflict creates smaller losses as the stakes decrease. This is why the preference for ethnic 
over class conflict varies inversely with m in this subcase.
To summarize: the rich prefer ethnic conflict whenever they are threatened by a class war, 
provided symmetry holds. The discussion above extends that proposition substantially when the 
symmetry restriction is dropped.
C. Class Conflict
A final ingredient of the analysis concerns group preferences across class conflict and peace. 
We first argue that the conditions of our model are not conducive to the rich initiating class 
conflict.
An immediate corollary of Proposition 1 is that the rich will not initiate class conflict if sr . 
s2r . Under the small-contributions assumption of that proposition, this condition can be shown 
to be equivalent to
 nr 
2
(9)  sr . a    b   , nr 1 anp
where a . wr u9 1 yr2 /wpu9 1 yp 2 . In the symmetric case, sr 5 1/2. Therefore, if np is around 70 per-
cent, (9) will hold whenever a . 1/5. Thus, if the rich have access to militants at the same rate as 
the poor and u 1c 2 5 Vc  , (9) holds whenever those below mean income earn more than 1/25 of 
those above the mean.
In the Indian case, those below mean income are about 70 percent of the population and 
earn around 35 percent of total income. The implied ratio of per capita incomes is therefore 
around a fifth, so a situation in which the rich initiate conflict, while possible, appears extremely 
unlikely.10
10 To be sure, as we increase the curvature on the utility function, the relative marginal cost of contributions by the 
rich will fall, which increases the possibility that the rich will initiate conflict. But even with logarithmic utilities the 
required ratio of incomes must fall below 20 percent, while 20 percent is the actual ratio suggested by the Indian data.
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In the nonsymmetric case one can expect only that the rich will garner a larger (per capita) 
share of the class public good. Moreover, they may not be able to raise a mercenary army on 
exactly the same terms as the poor (who would be additionally motivated by the prospect of vic-
tory). Each such variation would serve to further lower the gains from class conflict for the rich.
We may therefore state the following:
PROPOSITION 4: Under “reasonable” parametric restrictions, the rich will prefer peace to 
class conflict.
However, the poor may well initiate class conflict. Proposition 1 tells us that the required con-
dition is s2p . sp , which in parallel fashion to (9) translates into
 anp 
2
(10)  a    b . sp, nr 1 anp
where a, as before, is wr  u9 1 yr2 /wp u9 1 yp 2 . If we take u 1c 2 5  Vc  , wp 5 wr , and yp /yr 5 1 ⁄5 as we 
did above, then a 70 percent poor majority will precipitate class conflict whenever its per capita 
access to the class public good (relative to the rich) is 1/3 or less. This fraction rises to 1 ⁄2 when 
the poor enjoy a 75 percent majority. With an 85 percent majority the poor will initiate conflict 
even under symmetry.
These observations as well as a careful perusal of (10) yield:
PROPOSITION 5: for every value of np, there exists a threshold s 1np 2 such that if the peacetime 
share of the poor in class public goods falls below s 1np 2 , the poor will initiate class conflict. for 
np close enough to 1 this threshold exceeds 50 percent, so that the poor initiate class conflict in 
the symmetric case.
D. Ethnic salience
We now combine these arguments. Proposition 2 (with discussion) argues that the poor ethnic 
majority prefers ethnic to class conflict. This leaves open their preferences over conflict and 
peace. If peace is preferred by the poor ethnic majority, then the final outcome will indeed be 
peace. For by Proposition 4, the rich will not initiate class conflict, and under the conditions of 
Proposition 2, the ethnic minority will not initiate ethnic conflict.11
If, however, the poor ethnic majority prefers class conflict to peace, then—by Proposition 
3—their rich counterparts cannot choose peace. They will have to go along with ethnic conflict 
in order to avoid the class war.
Therefore only two equilibrium outcomes are possible: ethnic conflict or peace.
If, moreover, the conditions of Proposition 5 are met, the prospect of peace is eliminated. The 
unique outcome of the entire process must be ethnic conflict.
The parametric restrictions in the accompanying discussion show that these assertions aren’t 
unconditional. It is impossible (and unwise) to predict that ethnicity must be salient in all cir-
cumstances. What we do argue is that in a wide variety of situations that include the symmetric 
case, the potential synergy within a coalition of rich and poor can bring ethnic markers to the 
forefront. Indeed, it is hard to ignore the possible salience of any marker that creates a face-off 
across unranked groups, with inequality within those groups rather than across them.
11 In a public goods scenario, the ethnic minority typically plays a passive role. Matters are different when the stakes 
are privately divisible, as discussed in Section IVD.
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For completeness, we present a formal model of alliance formation that supports our conclu-
sions. We draw on standard theories of coalition formation (see Ray 2007 and the references 
therein).
To begin with, there are four separate groups, and the default payoff structure for these four 
groups is given by the peace payoff vector. Alliances form as follows. At each stage a group is 
“given the floor,” according to some protocol. The protocol is random, so that every group has 
some uniformly positive probability of seizing the floor. A group can either make a proposal 
(see below), or simply relinquish its opportunity to “speak,” at which point the floor is given to 
another group, again selected according to some exogenous probability distribution. If all groups 
continue in a similar vein and relinquish the opportunity to make a proposal, the game is over 
and peace payoffs are received.
Otherwise, at some stage, a group given the floor can make a proposal. The proposal is of the 
simplest form: it is made to a “compatriot group,” either of the same ethnicity or the same class, 
and it invites that compatriot to form an (ethnic or class) alliance. If the compatriot group agrees, 
the game is over. The corresponding alliance forms, and society enters into conflict. Each group 
then receives the expected payoff corresponding to ethnic or class conflict.
If the proposal is rejected, a fresh probability distribution determines a new proposer. Assume 
that the previous rejector must get this new role with positive probability. Now we are back to a 
stage akin to the very beginning of the game, and a similar story repeats itself.
To complete the description of the game, we must assign payoffs to a situation in which pro-
posals are made—and rejected—endlessly. In this case we give everybody the peace payoffs.
We allow for arbitrary history-dependent strategies. We make one innocuous assumption to 
mimic discounting:
CONDITION D: A group would rather reject a going proposal (or refuse to make a proposal) if 
that proposal involved giving the group its worst possible payoff in the game. Similarly, a group 
would prefer to accept a going proposal immediately if that proposal gave it the best possible 
payoff in the game.12
The following assertion assumes the results of our previous discussion.
PROPOSITION 6: suppose that all preferences over final outcomes are strict.13 Assume the 
conclusions in Propositions 2, 3, and 4, and assume Condition D.
Then it is possible to have ethnic conflict or peace, but never class conflict, as an equilibrium 
outcome of the alliance formation game.
In addition, if the conditions of Proposition 5 hold, ethnic conflict is the unique outcome of 
the alliance formation game.
The proof of this proposition may be found in the Web Appendix to the paper (http://www.
aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.98.5.2185).
12 This extremely reasonable restriction rules out self-fulfilling equilibria in which one side initiates conflict simply 
because they are sure that, if not, the other side will do so in the future.
13 This is a harmless genericity assumption that rules out knife-edge cases. See the Web Appendix for more 
discussion.
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IV. Extensions
A. flexible Transfers
Our model assumes that peacetime shares are given. One might suppose, however, that such 
shares could be chosen, perhaps to avoid conflict. After all, conflict is Pareto-suboptimal, so there 
must be some allocation of the peacetime surplus that Pareto-dominates the outcome from conflict.
The usual response to this criticism is that transfers may not be feasible or credible. There 
could be several reasons for the lack of feasibility, ranging from the inadequacy of fiscal mecha-
nisms to the constitutional and ethical question of some groups being compensated in money 
so that other groups may enjoy, say, religious supremacy. Moreover, quite apart from feasiblity, 
transfers may not be credible. An agreement not to currently engage in a conflict may strengthen 
the opposition, so that transfers cannot be extracted from them ex post (see, e.g., Fearon 1995; 
Michelle R. Garfinkel and Stergios Skaperdas 2000).
A somewhat more subtle response is that it may not be possible to write down a set of Pareto-
improving transfers (even though conflict is inefficient) because those transfers may not be able 
to improve on every potential source of conflict simultaneously. For instance, the same society 
may be subject to potential threats from class, religious, or spatial divisions, and the induced 
“core” of such a “game” may be empty, even if each of the potential conflicts is inefficient. Notice 
that this sort of analysis is intimately tied up with the salience question, in that several potential 
ways of carving up a given society must lurk in the background. This is the subject of our ongo-
ing research.
B. The Costs of Conflict
Our model adopts an extremely minimalist view of conflict. Militants are recruited, they are 
compensated, and then a black-box technology with the relative provision of militants as inputs 
churns out the probabilities of success or failure. Obviously, a conflict is more destructive than 
that, with costs that involve loss of life, property, and production.
Sterile though our specification may appear, some of these costs are already incorporated 
within the model, or at least are easy enough to accommodate with the most minor of variations. 
For instance, the potential dangers that face the militants in conflict can be easily accounted for 
by varying the compensation rate that needs to be paid. On the other hand, if the conflict involves 
direct destruction of output or property (as it surely must in any real-world situation), the model 
needs to be adjusted to a greater extent. One way to do this is to suppose that the budgets over 
which the conflict occurs are eroded in that conflict.
However, a little reflection will make it clear that this (realistic) variation on the model adds 
little by way of understanding ethnic salience. What it undoubtedly will do is reduce the range 
of parameters for which conflict (of any kind) might occur. Unless there is some reason to sup-
pose that one sort of conflict leads to fundamentally greater destruction, such a variation cannot 
reverse the bias toward ethnic conflict.
C. Polarization and Conflict
Our exercise yields insights into the connections between polarization and conflict.14 In exist-
ing literature, polarization is higher the greater the degree of “within-group” homogeneity and 
14 See Esteban and Ray (1994) and Michael C. Wolfson (1994) for initial developments of the concept of 
polarization.
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the greater the differences across groups. This intuition, while strong for individuals who differ 
along a single dimension, may be problematic for the multidimensional case.
In our study of salience, multidimensionality is indeed what is at stake: economic attributes 
may interact with other markers, such as religion, to produce a complex set of outcomes. Our 
model reflects this complexity. In contrast to the unidimensional view, in which greater homoge-
neity within a group makes for greater coherence and therefore a sharper conflict across groups, 
a multidimensional scenario may well generate more conflict from within-group heterogeneity, 
as it does here. Notice, though, that the heterogeneity is over a different attribute (income, in 
this case) than the one that determines the conflictual battle lines (ethnicity, in this case). It will 
be important to take account of this view in future research concerning the measurement of 
polarization.
D. Majorities, Minorities, and Public and Private Goods
We indicate how the analysis may be extended to contests over private goods. Suppose that X 
is a divisible, excludable budget at stake, so that peacetime per capita payoffs to a group of size 
n, per capita income y, and share s are given by
 s
 u 1 y 2 1   X.
 n
With conflict contributions at r per capita and a corresponding win probability of p, the conflict 
payoff to a contributor will be given by
 p
 u 1 y 2 r 2 1   X.
 n
Additional remarks on these payoff functions are relegated to a footnote.15
An exact analogue of Proposition 1 (and following the same steps) is easy to obtain. Just as 
before, however, (3) and (4) are stated for endogenous variables. A translation into the underly-
ing demographic structure yields very different results in the case of private goods. Now, it will 
typically be the minority groups that wish to instigate conflict, under the corresponding “peace 
symmetry” assumption that si 5 ni. We omit the details of this calculation.
This reversal, however, suggests only that the ethnic minority will now be pivotal in precipitat-
ing equilibrium outcomes, whereas in our model this role was played by the ethnic majority. But 
little else changes. It is still true that a synergy exists across rich and poor in a group, so that all 
other things being equal the poor ethnic minority will prefer ethnic conflict to class conflict.
In brief, the conclusions for ethnic salience should remain unaffected, but now the minorities 
will generally be the perpetrators of any conflict that might occur. The relationship between the 
degree to which the prize is public and the role of minorities versus majorities in the instigation 
of conflict is a fascinating topic that is worth pursuing further.
15 One might wonder why a private payoff is kept apart from the private consumption of an individual summarized 
by y (in peace) or by y 2 r (in terms of conflict). Certainly, it is possible to lump all of these items together under 
one utility umbrella so that—for instance—the peacetime payoff is, say, u 1 y 1 sX / n 2 . But this formulation does not 
adequately capture the feature that contributions must be made “before” the payoff is enjoyed, so that any utility costs 
of contributions must be borne up front. One way to think about such matters is that the two consumptions are separated 
“in time,” so that the payoffs come under two utility umbrellas: u 1 y 2 1 v 1sX / n 2 , where v is some value function. This 
is the formulation adopted in the text, except that we take v to be linear for expositional convenience.
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V. Concluding Remarks
Our main results state that in the presence of economic inequality, there is a systemic bias 
toward ethnic conflict. This is not at all to suggest that class conflict cannot occur. The point is 
that under the peace symmetry conditions identified in the paper—and under a large and robust 
set of departures from it—ethnic identities may be focal.
Why might ethnic divisions be salient? We point to the combined effect of two forces. First, 
unlike class alliances, ethnic groups possess within-group income heterogeneity. It is true that 
such heterogeneity may weaken within-group coordination and hence reduce the level of col-
lective action. But we argue that this effect is dwarfed by the within-group specialization that 
such heterogeneity provides. The elite contribute financial resources, while the masses contribute 
conflict labor. This is the synergy that drives ethnic alliances.
The second factor concerns the key role played by the elites. As we show, even though the 
rich may prefer peace overall, they might end up financing ethnic conflict in order to avoid the 
alternative of class unrest. By highlighting the role of the elites, our model also underlines the 
class origin of “conflict labor.” This specialization seems to correspond with the factual observa-
tion that young men, overwhelmingly drawn from the poor and the unemployed, furnish conflict 
labor while the rich contribute the financial means.16
There are possibly many reasons for the salience of ethnic conflict. What we choose to empha-
size in this paper is the role played by unequal wealth, in which money and the cheap availability 
of labor can combine to create the severest of conflicts. This observation on the link between 
inequality and violence may be useful in studying other situations, including some of the most 
prominent international conflicts currently under way.
Appendix
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1:
Let G stand for a generic budget to be seized, and k and / be the two alliances. Then economic 
group i in alliance k prefers conflict if and only if
 wk  Aik Ak u 1 yi 2 2 u a yi 2     b , c      2 sk d G. nik Ak 1 A/
Under our small-contributions assumption, this is approximately equivalent to
 wk  Aik wk  Aik Ak(11) u9 a yi 2     b     , c      2 sk d G. nik  nik Ak 1 A/
If group i is not a financial contributor, then Aik 5 0 and (3) follows immediately from (11). 
Otherwise, by the first-order conditions for payoff maximization,
 wk  Aik wk  Aik Ak A/(12) u9 a yi 2     b     5 lik       G. nik  nik 1Ak 1 A/22
16 One can cite numerous instances of this observation in the literature. For instance, Kapferer (1998) in his study of 
Sri Lanka observes that “Sinhalese gangs made up largely of impoverished and unemployed youth attacked Tamils in 
their houses and shops, settling old scores and looting.” And Engineer (2002), reflecting on the Gujarat carnage, writes 
that “There is another factor which also should be seriously reflected upon: participation of Dalits and Backwards in this 
genocide on a big scale. Many have emphasised Dalit-Muslim unity to fight communal fascism. But the Hindutvawadis 
have instilled a sense of Hinduness among Dalits for their misuse against Muslims.”
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Combining (11) and (12), we may conclude that the relevant condition is
 Ak A/ Aj
 lik      ,      2 sj . 1Ak 1 A/22  Aj 1 Ak
Manipulate this inequality to obtain (3).
The second part of the proof uses:
LEMMA 1: In unranked ethnic conflict, nj 5 sj for j 5 h, m.
PROOF:
Say the result is false. Without loss of generality, suppose that nh /nm . Ah /Am. Because nih /nim 
5 nh /nm for any economic subgroup i, there is some i—say r—such that r is a financial contribu-
tor for alliance m and nrh /nrm . Ah /Am. In any alliance j 1 j 5 h, m 2 , the first-order condition for 
r may be written as
 wj  Aj wj  Aj Ah  Am(13)  u9ayk 2 lrj    b     $       E, nrj nrj 1Ah 1 Am 22
with equality if lrj . 0. Using unranked conflict, the fact that r is a financial contributor for alli-
ance m, and the presumption that nrh/nrm . Ah/Am, we may conclude from (13) that
(14)  lrh . lrm .
But this means that lpm . 0, so that p is also a financial contributor at m. Moreover, nph/npm 5 
nrh/nrm . Ah/Am. Therefore, exactly the same argument holds for p, and lph . lpm. But this con-
tradicts (14).
Now we complete the main proof. By Lemma 1, ethnic conflict dominates class conflict for 
economic group i with ethnic characteristic j if and only if
 wj  Aij wi  Ai Ai nj E 1 u ayi 2     b 1 siC . sj E 1 u ayi 2     b 1       C, nij ni Ap 1 Ar
or, equivalently, if
 wi Ai Ai wj Aij u 1 yi 2 2 u ayi 2     b 1 csi 2      d C . u 1 yi 2 2 u ayi 2     b 1 1sj 2 nj 2 E. ni Ap 1 Ar nij
Under the small-contributions assumption, this condition is approximately equivalent to
 wi Ai wi Ai Ai wj Aij wj Aij u9ayi 2     b     1 csi 2      d C . u9 ayi 2     b     1 1sj 2 nj 2 E, ni ni Ap 1 Ar nij nij
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and invoking first-order conditions for class and ethnic conflict,17 we may write this as
 Ai 
2
 Am  Ah(15)  si 2 a    b . clij      1 1sj 2 nj 2 d m,
 Ap 1 Ar 1Am1Ah 22
where m ; E/C. Now, recall that nj 5 Aj / 1Ah 1 Am 2 by Lemma 1, so a rearrangement of (15) 
yields (4).
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